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One of the defining relationships in modern Silicon Valley is the interaction between Apple and Google. For decades the companies have mixed intense competition—
That message is part of a trove of potentially damning internal communications coming to light as part of the US Department of Justice’s antitrust case against Alphabet Inc.’s Google, where the government accuses the search giant of freezing out competitors through deals like the one it has with Apple. The trial marks the first time since the case against
The moment marks a new era of trustbusting aimed at the tech sector. The Justice Department has already filed a second
This first trial, which is scheduled to take 10 weeks, focuses only on
The Justice Department and 52 attorneys general representing US states or territories accuse Google of paying billions of dollars to maintain its monopoly over search through agreements with tech rivals, smartphone manufacturers and wireless providers. While Google made a number of these deals, its agreement with Apple looms largest. First forged 18 years ago, it made Google Apple’s default search engine, while giving Apple as much as a 50% share of the ad revenue Google made from searches by users of Apple’s Safari browser. Google rode the wave of Apple’s successes in mobile, and enforcers say it now has a 90% share of the overall search market. At the same time, Apple has pocketed billions of dollars annually from the relationship—an estimated $18 billion in 2022 alone, according to
The Justice Department’s allegations mirror those made in the Microsoft case from the late 1990s, which centered on that company’s practice of pre-installing its Internet Explorer browser on computers that ran the Windows operating system, then imposing technical obstacles to prevent computer manufacturers or consumers from installing rival web browsers such as Netscape. Google rejects such comparisons. Unlike Microsoft’s browser defaults, Google’s deals do not include any technical barriers that restrict switching to competing browsers, and the process is simple, according to
The power of default settings in tech has been the subject of significant research. Eric Johnson, a professor at Columbia Business School who studies decision-making, says defaults can significantly affect consumer choices even when the technical barriers to switching are low. In one study, for example, 82% of people agreed to be an organ donor if the “yes” box on the form was prechecked, versus only 42% when “no” was the default choice. “It’s not just the physical effort of clicking or unclicking a button,” says Johnson, who’s spent 30 years researching how the presentation of choices changes consumer behavior. “It’s that mental effort. The crux here is that people don’t really want to think about—or aren’t even aware—that there’s a choice.”
Apple demonstrated this power in 2012, when it switched the default map program on iOS devices to its own maps app, which is widely seen as inferior. Google analyzed how many users it lost from that change, then how much revenue it might lose if Apple switched to a different search engine. That analysis, the Justice Department said last year, inspired Google to re-up its search deal when it expired after 10 years.
A major inspiration for the original partnership, according to Apple executive
When Google and Apple made their deal in 2005, Safari accounted for only 1.3% of the search market. But its share rose with the success of its mobile devices, and by 2014, Google was paying Apple about $1 billion a year for its default status on Safari, according to a figure shared accidentally during a court hearing in an unrelated lawsuit.
Deals in which search engines pay for default status on web browsers and mobile devices aren’t unusual. In addition to Safari, Google is the default search engine on the Firefox browser, developed by the nonprofit organization
A Google executive told FTC investigators in 2012 that the company’s search volume could decrease as much as 50% if Apple replaced Google Search with Bing. “We are paying for the promotional placement and the default setting,” he said, according to a leaked 2012 FTC memo first published by Politico in 2021. By 2020, when the Justice Department and states sued, they estimated that Google was the default on 90% of mobile browsers and 83% of computer browsers.
Google has never disclosed how much it pays in these deals. According to the FTC memo, the company paid between $10.9 billion and $13.1 billion in 2012 to secure its default position. In securities filings, the company discloses payments made to partners from revenue-sharing agreements, along with money paid to website publishers and YouTube creators for advertising, in one figure. Those payments amounted to $48.95 billion in 2022.
When Apple and Google renegotiated their deal in 2016, the amended agreement expanded use of Alphabet’s search engine to Siri—which had been using Microsoft’s Bing—and Spotlight, a search feature to find programs and files on Apple devices. Two years later, Apple Chief Executive Officer
Walker, Alphabet’s chief legal officer, says there’s nothing nefarious about such deals and that Google views its relationship with Apple as one of “co-opetition”—part cooperation, part competition. “We work with them on a variety of different areas and make our products and services available” on the iPhone, he says. “At the same time, we compete with them.”
But while such a deal may have seemed benign in 2005, the situation changed as the companies became so large, according to Rebecca Allensworth of Vanderbilt Law School. Their multibillion-dollar deal is effectively buying them protection against future competition. “You are not supposed to be able to cooperate with your competitors,” she says.
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